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Abstract
To control, evaluate, and motivate their agents, ﬁrms employ supervisors. As shown by
empirical investigations, biased evaluation by supervisors linked to collusion is a persistent
feature of ﬁrms. This paper studies how deceptive supervision aﬀects agency relationships.
We consider a three-level ﬁrm where a supervisor is in charge of producing a veriﬁable report
on an agent’s output. Depending on the output he has observed, the supervisor may either
collude with the agent or with the principal, and make an uninformative report. We show
that the proliferation of collusive activities in ﬁrms: modiﬁes the conﬁguration of the optimal
preventive policy, may increase the expected cost of preventing each type of collusion, is
beneﬁcial to the supervisor and detrimental to the agent, and is not always harmful.
Keywords : Firm; Group decision; Control; Biased supervision.
JEL Classification : D20; D73; L20; M50.
Résumé
Les ﬁrmes emploient des superviseurs pour contrôler, évaluer et motiver leurs employés.
Ainsi que le montrent les études empiriques, les biais d’évaluation associés à la collusion sont
fréquents dans les ﬁrmes. Cet article étudie les conséquences de ce type de biais sur les relations
hiérarchiques d’agence. Nous considérons une ﬁrme principal-superviseur-agent dans laquelle
le rôle du superviseur est de faire un rapport sur la production de l’agent. Suivant le niveau de
production observé, le superviseur peut former une coalition avec le principal ou avec l’agent et
dissimuler l’information obtenue. L’article montre que la prolifération des formes de collusion
à l’intérieur de la ﬁrme : modiﬁe la conﬁguration de la politique préventive optimale, peut
accroître le coût espéré de la prévention de chaque forme de collusion, proﬁte au superviseur
et nuit à l’agent, et n’est pas toujours néfaste.
Mots-clés: Firme; Décision de groupe; Contrôle; Supervision biaisée.
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Boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13 ; E-mail : kouroche.vafai@libertysurf.fr
1
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.84
1 Introduction
This paper investigates how deceptive supervision aﬀects ﬁrms. As stressed by the inﬂuential
work of Berle and Means (1932), an essential feature of the modern corporation is the separation
of ownership and control. To control, evaluate, and motivate their agents, modern corporations
employ professional supervisors whose roles are to acquire and transmit information about these
agents. Once informed, a supervisor may engage in collusive activities, withhold valuable infor-
mation, and therefore produce a biased report. Worldwide scandals have revealed how pervasive
collusion among members of both regulated and unregulated hierarchical agency relationships is.1
Preventing collusive supervision has become a central concern of ﬁrms. Since the pioneering stud-
ies of Antle (1984) and Tirole (1986), a large literature has been devoted to the issue of collusion
between the supervisor and the agent within principal-supervisor-agent relationships.2
It has recently been shown that the harmfulness of supervisor/agent collusion is very sensitive
to the environment in which it may occur and that this type of collusion is often costless to deter
(e.g., Vafaï 2002; Cont 2004 and references therein). These ﬁndings question the relevance of the
literature on supervisor/agent collusion. We analyze how a ﬁrm is impacted by biased supervision
and notably identify a cause for supervisor/agent collusion harmfulness, namely the presence of
more than a single type of collusion.
Agency models of unoﬃcial activities in hierarchies have also been criticized on the ground
that they focus exclusively on unoﬃcial activities involving members of lower levels (e.g., Perrow
1986; Dow 1987). Milgrom and Roberts (1988) argue that the cost of unoﬃcial activities between
superiors is the major cost of transacting in hierarchies. The main shortcoming of the literature
on collusion in hierarchical ﬁrms is that it only focuses on downward collusion, that is, on collusion
1Two of the many recent examples are collusion scandals at the Canadian Radio-television and Telecom-
munications Commission and at the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.
2This literature is reviewed by Tirole (1992).
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between the supervisor and the agent, or, equivalently, on reporting biases beneﬁcial to the agent.
In addition to supervisor/agent collusion, a principal-supervisor-agent ﬁrm is also vulnerable to
collusion between the principal and the supervisor. Empirical studies ﬁnd evidence of supervisory
reporting biases both beneﬁcial (i.e., over-reporting) and detrimental (i.e., under-reporting) to the
supervisor’s subordinate (e.g., Holzbach 1978; Gabris and Michell 1988; Murphy and Cleveland
1995; Arvey and Murphy 1998). While these biases may be the consequences of the personal pref-
erences or tendencies of the supervisor3 , they may also be the consequences of informal agreements
between the supervisor and the agent - as it is the case when these two employees collude - or
between the principal and the supervisor. Indeed, as shown, for example, by Crozier (1967) and
Crozier and Friedberg (1980) in their studies of big French regulated monopolies, a supervisor’s
loyalty to her/his principal may result in principal/supervisor collusion, and thus in an unfair
treatment of the supervisor’s subordinate. Is this type of collusion also often harmless? Is there
any interaction between the two types of collusion or, equivalently, does it matter that a ﬁrm is
vulnerable to multiple types of collusion rather than to a single one? To answer these questions, we
consider a general environment where a three-level ﬁrm may be vulnerable to both supervisor/agent
and principal/supervisor collusion. The paper thus accounts for the above-mentioned criticisms by
considering both collusion involving members of lower and upper levels of hierarchies.4
In our three-level hierarchy with moral hazard a supervisor is responsible for providing a princi-
pal with a report about an agent’s output. The supervisor operates an imperfect control technology
that reveals hard (unforgeable) information/evidence about the agent’s output only with a certain
probability. The informed supervisor then has the possibility to withhold information and claim
3For example, one of the most studied of these tendencies is known as the horns and halo eﬀect (e.g.,
Klimoski and London 1974). This eﬀect refers to a supervisor’s tendency to be unduly inﬂuenced by an
unfavorable (horns) or favorable (halo) ﬁrst impression on a subordinate.
4While various forms of corrupt behavior inside institutions have been studied by economists - such
as sabotage (e.g., Lazear 1989; Bose, Pal and Sappington 2010), rent-seeking (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny 1993), and corruption (e.g., Silva, Kahn and Zhu 2007) - the focus of this paper is collusive
activities taking place in multi-level agency relationships with hard information in the tradition of Tirole
(1986, 1992).
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that control has not been decisive. If control reveals hard evidence that the agent has produced a
high output, that is, if the information obtained by the supervisor is unfavorable to the principal
- in the sense that the principal then has to pay a higher wage to the agent than in the case where
control is indecisive - the supervisor may collude with the principal and, in exchange for a bribe,
make an uninformative report. If instead control reveals evidence that a low output has been
produced, that is, if the information obtained by the supervisor is unfavorable to the agent - in
the sense that the agent then receives a lower wage than in the case where control is indecisive -
the supervisor may collude with the agent and, in exchange for a bribe, report that control has
not been decisive.
We characterize the optimal contracts in this environment. To understand the extra modiﬁca-
tions that the simultaneous threats of supervisor/agent and principal/supervisor collusion intro-
duce in a ﬁrm, we ﬁrst characterize the optimal contracts in a three-level hierarchy vulnerable to a
single type of collusion. It is shown that collusion may be costlessly deterred in a ﬁrm exclusively
vulnerable to supervisor/agent collusion. In other words, the sole possibility of supervisor/agent
collusion is harmless. We then show that it is costly to deter principal/supervisor collusion in a ﬁrm
exclusively vulnerable to this type of unoﬃcial activity. Unlike supervisor/agent collusion, collusion
between the principal and the supervisor is thus harmful. The possibility of principal/supervisor
collusion raises the important question of who will guard the ultimate guardian? To optimally
resolve this issue, the principal needs to impose a constraint on itself that prevents collusion with
the supervisor. We ﬁnally analyze the general case where a ﬁrm is vulnerable to both types of
collusion and show that, compared with the case where only a single type of collusive activity may
occur, in the presence of two types of collusion: the conﬁguration of the optimal preventive policy
is modiﬁed, supervisor/agent collusion is not systematically harmless anymore, the eﬃciency of the
ﬁrm is sometimes reduced, and the supervisor more often receives a rent, whereas the agent less
4
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often receives a rent. These results are the consequences of the existence of negative interactions
between collusive activities. Indeed, compared with the single type cases, in certain circumstances
the threat of a second type of collusion increases the cost of deterring each type of collusion.
These ﬁndings prove that the proliferation of collusive activities has major impacts on a ﬁrm,
and hence considering only the possibility of supervisor/agent collusion in the analysis of multi-
level hierarchies is deceptive. Although supervisor/agent collusion may be costlessly deterred in
a ﬁrm vulnerable exclusively to this type of unoﬃcial activity, this is not the case anymore when
principal/supervisor collusion is also considered.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is outlined in Section 2. Section
3 characterizes the optimal incentive contracts in the absence of collusion. Section 4 characterizes
the optimal incentive contracts respectively when a single type of collusion is possible and when
two types of collusion are possible. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are given in an Appendix.
2 The model
A risk neutral principal-supervisor-agent ﬁrm under moral hazard operates as follows. The agent is
the productive unit. She has the choice between shirking, in which case her eﬀort level is e = 0, and
working hard by exerting e = 1. Working hard results in the production of a high output xH > 0
with probability π ∈ (0, 1) and the production of a low output xL ≡ 0 with probability 1 − π,
whereas shirking results in the production of a low output. The agent’s eﬀort level is unobservable
to the principal and the supervisor.
The principal (it) charges a supervisor (he) to acquire and transmit, through a veriﬁable report,
hard information/evidence about the agent’s output. The supervisor has access to an imperfect
control technology that reveals hard evidence on the agent’s output with probability p ∈ (0, 1). The
supervisor’s report, r, can thus take the following values r ∈ {xL, ∅, xH}, where r = ∅ means that
5
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.84
control has been indecisive. The evidence obtained by the supervisor is his private information,
but, once revealed it is veriﬁable.5 The supervisor may then withhold evidence by reporting r = ∅
whenever control has been decisive. Indeed, as standard in the literature on collusion6 , given that
the evidence obtained by the supervisor is hard, the supervisor cannot misreport the high output
as low output or the low output as high output.
The agent and the supervisor have the following utility functions UA(w, e) = w − γe and
US(s) = s, where w and s are their wages and γ > 0 is the agent’s disutility of eﬀort. Reservation
utilities are normalized to zero.
Given that only the supervisor’s report is veriﬁable, contracts are contingent on this report.
Denoting by w the wage of the agent and by s that of the supervisor, contracts are thus (wL, w∅, wH)
and (sL, s∅, sH). Employees are protected by limited liability, and hence the principal cannot make
negative transfers to them.
It is assumed that xH is large enough for it to be in the principal’s interest to operate the ﬁrm. In
this environment, the goal of the principal is thus to both motivate the agent to pick e = 1 and mini-
mize the expected cost of the ﬁrmC(wL, w∅, wH , sL, s∅, sH) ≡ p [π(wH + sH) + (1− π)(wL + sL)]+
(1− p)(w∅ + s∅).
Since the control technology is imperfect and information is hard, the supervisor has discretion
to make a deceptive/biased report. Indeed, the supervisor may engage in two types of collusive
activity.7 When the supervisor acquires evidence that the output produced is xL, he may collude
with the agent and report r = ∅ instead of r = xL. If supervisor/agent collusion occurs, the agent
thus receives w∅ instead of wL from the principal and pays a bribe to the supervisor. When the
5 In other words, evidence is veriﬁable only by the person(s) to whom the supervisor reveals it. Evidence
is publicly veriﬁable only when the supervisor produces his report.
6See Tirole (1992).
7As shown in Vafaï (2002, 2010), multi-level ﬁrms may also be vulnerable to other forms of unoﬃcial
activity. Vafaï (2010) considers collusive activities but does not investigate their interplay and their impact
on the internal organization of the ﬁrm.
6
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.84
supervisor acquires evidence that the output produced is xH , he may collude with the principal
and report r = ∅ instead of r = xH . If principal/supervisor collusion takes place, the principal
therefore pays w∅ + s∅ to its employees (plus a bribe to the supervisor) instead of wH + sH .
We make the assumption that when collusion occurs, the supervisor unoﬃcially shows the
private evidence acquired to his collusive partner. Expressed diﬀerently, in line with Tirole’s
(1986, 1992) standard models, collusion takes place under symmetric information on evidence
among colluders.
We also make the following standard assumptions on collusive activities (see, for example,
Tirole 1992). First, side transfers between the agent and the supervisor or between the principal
and the supervisor are made at a rate k ∈ (0, 1]. If k ∈ (0, 1), a side transfer creates a deadweight
loss. A side transfer of size t is then only worth kt to the supervisor. Among the many possible
explanations for this is that bribes may be non-monetary and/or organizing collusion has a cost.
Collusion therefore becomes easier as k increases. If instead k = 1, the side transfer technology
is totally eﬃcient. Second, side transfers are enforceable. Third, collusion is only observable to
colluders. Fourth, the supervisor has all the bargaining power when engaging in collusion. Fifth,
the supervisor does not engage in collusion when indiﬀerent, that is, when payoﬀs associated with
colluding and not colluding are identical.
The evolution of the three-level agency relationship is thus the following: (1) The principal
oﬀers contracts to its employees contingent on the supervisor’s report. (2) Employees accept or
reject these contracts. (3) The agent picks e = 0 or e = 1 and control takes place. (4) Control
reveals the agent’s output with probability p and decisions of whether or not to engage in collusive
activities are made. (5) The supervisor makes a report r. (6) Transfers and side transfers are
realized.
7
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3 Firm with unbiased supervision
This section investigates the ideal case where the supervisor does not engage in collusive ac-
tivities. This corresponds to the case where k = 0. To motivate the agent to pick e = 1,
the contract, (wL, w∅, wH), oﬀered by the principal must satisfy the agent’s incentive constraint
p [πwH + (1− π)wL] + (1− p)w∅ − γ ≥ pwL + (1− p)w∅, or equivalently
8 ,
wH − wL ≥
γ
pπ
. (1)
Since transfers must be nonnegative, we have
wL ≥ 0, w∅ ≥ 0, wH ≥ 0, sL≥ 0, s∅≥ 0,sH≥ 0. (2)
The agent’s contract must also verify her participation constraint, p [πwH + (1− π)wL] + (1−
p)w∅− γ ≥ 0. Given that transfers must be nonnegative, this constraint is less restrictive that the
agent’s incentive constraint, and hence will not be considered.
Since supervision does not imply any cost, the supervisor will accept any contract (sL, s∅, sH) ∈
IR3+.
To motivate the informed supervisor to report truthfully, the supervisor’s contract must also
satisfy sL ≥ s∅ and sH ≥ s∅. Since the optimal contract oﬀered to the supervisor in this case and
in the subsequent cases verify these constraints, they will not be considered.
A ﬁrm where supervision is unbiased has the following program:
[P0] min C(wL, w∅, wH , sL, s∅, sH)
wL, w∅, wH , sL, s∅, sH
s.t. (1) and (2).
8We make the standard assumption that the agent chooses to work when she is indiﬀerent.
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Proposition 1 summarizes the solution to this program.
Proposition 1. Inside a ﬁrm with unbiased supervision:
1. The optimal contracts are (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, 0,
γ
pπ
) and (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0, 0). The expected
cost of the ﬁrm is C0 ≡ γ.
2. Neither the supervisor nor the agent captures an informational rent.
When collusive supervision may not occur in a ﬁrm, the principal keeps both employees to their
reservation utility levels.
4 Firm with biased supervision
This section considers respectively the cases where only a single type of collusion is possible and
where both types of collusion may occur. As shown in Vafaï (2008), there is no loss of generality
in restricting attention to contracts that deter collusive activities
4.1 Single type of bias in supervision
We will consider, respectively, the case where only supervisor/agent collusion may occur in a ﬁrm
and the case where it is vulnerable only to principal/supervisor collusion (see Figure 1).
4.1.1 Downward biased supervision
In a the three-level hierarchy vulnerable exclusively to supervisor/agent collusion, this type of
unoﬃcial activity may occur when control reveals evidence that the agent’s output is low. This
happens either when the agent picks e = 0 or when she picks e = 1 but produces only xL. If
supervisor/agent collusion occurs, a bribe is transferred to the supervisor for biased reporting,
that is, for reporting r = ∅ instead of r = xL.
9
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The prevention of supervisor/agent collusion imposes an extra constraint on the ﬁrm. Collusion
takes place if it is proﬁtable for both parties. If the agent chooses to collude with the supervisor,
her utility is w∅−bD if she has picked e = 0, and w∅−bD−γ if she has picked e = 1 but the output
has been xL, where bD is the bribe transferred to the supervisor. If the agent chooses not to collude
with the supervisor, her utility is wL if she has picked e = 0, and wL − γ if she has picked e = 1
but has produced only xL. The agent thus ﬁnds collusion beneﬁcial as long as w∅ − bD ≥ wL - or,
equivalently, as long as w∅ − bD − γ ≥ wL − γ - that is, as long as bD ≤ w∅ − wL. The maximum
bribe, bD, the agent is willing to oﬀer for information concealment is hence bD ≡ w∅ − wL. The
supervisor has all the bargaining power and may extract bD from the agent. The supervisor will
ﬁnd collusion not proﬁtable if his utility from producing an unbiased report, sL, is higher than his
utility from producing a biased report, s∅ + kbD, that is, if
sL ≥ s∅ + k(w∅ − wL), (3)
where w∅ − wL is the stake of supervisor/agent collusion. This constraint is the supervisor/agent
no-collusion constraint. As explained in the Appendix, since it is optimal to set s∅ = 0, constraint
(3) indicates that there are two ways of deterring supervisor/agent collusion. The ﬁrst way is
to create incentive payments for the supervisor, that is, to oﬀer w∅ > wL and then to oﬀer sL
suﬃciently large. The second way to deter supervisor/agent collusion is to break down its stake,
that is, to oﬀer w∅ = wL. The program of a three-level ﬁrm vulnerable to supervisor/agent collusion
is thus program [P0] with the extra constraint (3).
As may easily be seen, the collusion-free contracts of Proposition 1 also immunize the ﬁrm
against supervisor/agent collusion. We may thus state:
Proposition 2. Collusion between the supervisor and the agent is harmless.
This result is in line with the growing body of literature, mentioned in the introduction, that
10
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.84
proves that the harmfulness of supervisor/agent collusion depends crucially on the environment
where it may occur and that this type of collusion can be costlessly prevented in a broad class of
circumstances. Slightly modifying Tirole’s (1986, 1992) standard models may result in supervi-
sor/agent collusion becoming costless to deter or even beneﬁcial. In the light of these results the
relevance of the literature on supervisor/agent collusion has been questioned.
In contrast to that literature which exclusively considers supervisor/agent collusion, we show,
in the next sections, that all types of collusion are not harmless and that in the presence of collusion
between the principal and the supervisor, collusion between the supervisor and the agent is not
harmless anymore. Expressed diﬀerently, we prove that investigating exclusively supervisor/agent
collusion in ﬁrms is deceptive.
4.1.2 Upward biased supervision
In a hierarchical ﬁrm vulnerable only to principal/supervisor collusion, this type of unoﬃcial
activity may take place when control reveals evidence that the agent’s output is high. If princi-
pal/supervisor collusion occurs, a bribe is transferred to the supervisor for biased reporting, that
is, for reporting r = ∅ instead of r = xH . The wage costs for the principal associated with not
colluding and colluding with the supervisor are respectively wH + sH and w∅ + s∅ + bU , where bU
denotes the bribe paid for a biased report. The principal thus ﬁnds collusion beneﬁcial as long as
w∅ + s∅ + bU ≤ wH + sH . The maximum bribe, bU , it is then ready to pay for a biased report is
bU ≡ wH + sH − w∅ − s∅. The supervisor has all the bargaining power and may extract bU from
the principal. The supervisor does not ﬁnd collusion beneﬁcial if sH ≥ s∅ + kbU . That is, if
sH ≥ s∅ +
k
1− k
(wH − w∅) for k ∈ (0, 1) or w∅ ≥ wH for k = 1. (4)
These constraints are the principal/supervisor no-collusion constraints. Since optimally s∅ = 0,
when k ∈ (0, 1), there are two ways to deter principal/supervisor collusion. The ﬁrst way is to
11
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create incentive payments for the supervisor, that is, to oﬀer wH > w∅ and then oﬀer sH suﬃciently
large. The second way to deter collusion between the principal and the supervisor is to break down
its stake, that is, to oﬀer wH = w∅. We will refer to these policies respectively as an incentive
policy and a stake eliminating policy.
The program of a hierarchical ﬁrm vulnerable exclusively to principal/supervisor collusion then
writes:
[P1] min C(wL, w∅, wH , sL, s∅, sH)
wL, w∅, wH , sL, s∅, sH
s.t. (1), (2), and (4).
Deﬁne π˜ ≡ (1−k)(1−p)
pk
. The solution to this program is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Inside a ﬁrm vulnerable only to principal/supervisor collusion:
1. The optimal policy is (a) an incentive policy with (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, 0,
γ
pπ
) and (sL, s∅, sH) =
(0, 0, kγ(1−k)pπ ) if k ∈ (0, 1) and (i) p ≤ 1 − k; (ii) p > 1 − k and π ≤ π˜. The expected cost of
the ﬁrm is then C1 ≡ γ1−k . (b) a stake eliminating policy with (wL, w∅, wH) = (0,
γ
pπ
, γ
pπ
) and
(sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0, 0) if (i) k ∈ (0, 1), p > 1 − k and π > π˜; (ii) k = 1. The expected cost of the
ﬁrm is then C2 ≡ [1−p(1−π)]γ
pπ
.
2. Either the supervisor or the agent captures an informational rent. When the principal adopts
an incentive policy (resp. a stake eliminating policy) this rent is captured by the supervisor (resp.
the agent).
3. Collusion is harmful.
We optimally have wL = 0 (= s∅), and thus wH =
γ
pπ
from the agent’s incentive constraint. To
set w∅, the principal faces a trade-oﬀ. As shown in the Appendix, to cope with principal/supervisor
12
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collusion, it may either break down the stake of this type of collusion by oﬀering w∅ = wH =
γ
pπ
- and hence sH = 0 - or it may keep the stake of principal/supervisor collusion while creating
incentives for the supervisor to make an unbiased report, that is, it may oﬀer wH =
γ
pπ
> w∅ = 0 -
and thus sH =
kγ
(1−k)pπ . We have referred to these policies respectively as a stake eliminating policy
and an incentive policy. Compared with an incentive policy, a stake eliminating policy consists
in paying a higher wage w∅ to the agent but a lower wage sH to the supervisor. Clearly, when
an incentive policy is adopted, a rent is paid to the supervisor, whereas when a stake eliminating
policy is adopted a rent is paid to the agent. In other words, an incentive policy beneﬁts the
supervisor whereas a stake eliminating policy beneﬁts the agent. Unlike supervisor/agent collusion,
principal/supervisor collusion is systematically harmful.
Several cases should then be distinguished for k ∈ (0, 1). If the control technology is strongly
imperfect (p ≤ 1 − k), that is, if it is likely that control will be indecisive, and hence it is likely
that w∅ will be paid to the agent and sH will not be paid to the supervisor, the principal’s optimal
policy is an incentive policy. In the alternative case where the control technology is weakly imperfect
(p > 1−k), it is unlikely that control will be indecisive, that is, it is unlikely that w∅ will be paid to
the agent. The principal’s policy choice then depends on the quality of the production technology.
When the production technology is relatively ineﬃcient (π ≤ π˜), and thus it is unlikely that sH
will be paid to the supervisor, the optimal policy is an incentive policy.
Finally, in the case where k = 1 the optimal policy is a stake eliminating policy. Indeed, since
in this case deterring principal/supervisor collusion requires that the principal sets w∅ ≥ wH and
since the objective function is increasing in w∅, we optimally have w∅ = wH =
γ
pπ
.
13
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4.2 Multiple types of bias in supervision
We now consider the general case of a ﬁrm vulnerable to multiple types of bias in supervision (see
Figure 2). The program of a hierarchical ﬁrm vulnerable to both supervisor/agent and princi-
pal/supervisor collusion is [P1] with the additional constraint (3). This extended program will be
referred to as [P2].
Deﬁne π ≡ (1−k)[1−p(1−k)]
pk(2−k) . Proposition 4 summarizes the solution to [P2].
Proposition 4. Inside a ﬁrm vulnerable to both supervisor/agent and principal/supervisor
collusion:
1. The optimal policy is (a) an incentive policy with (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, 0,
γ
pπ
) and (sL, s∅, sH) =
(0, 0, kγ(1−k)pπ ) if k ∈ (0, 1) and (i) p ≤ 1 − k; (ii) p > 1 − k and π ≤ π. The expected
cost of the ﬁrm is then C1. (b) a stake eliminating policy with (wL, w∅, wH) = (0,
γ
pπ
, γ
pπ
) and
(sL, s∅, sH) = (
kγ
pπ
, 0, 0) if (i) k ∈ (0, 1), p > 1− k and π > π; (ii) k = 1. The expected cost of the
ﬁrm is then C3 ≡ [1−p(1−π)(1−k)]γ
pπ
.
2. When the principal adopts a stake eliminating policy (a) the two types of collusion negatively
interact, and hence the possibility of principal/supervisor collusion makes supervisor/agent collu-
sion harmful. (b) both the supervisor and the agent capture informational rents. The supervisor
captures the informational rent generated by the deterrence of supervisor/agent collusion, whereas
the agent captures the informational rent generated by the deterrence of principal/supervisor col-
lusion. (c) the eﬃciency loss sustained by the ﬁrm is higher compared with the cases where it is
vulnerable to a single type of collusion.
3. When the principal adopts an incentive policy (a) the two types of collusion do not inter-
act, and hence supervisor/agent collusion remains harmless. (b) only the supervisor captures an
informational rent. This rent - generated by the deterrence of principal/supervisor collusion - is
14
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identical to that extracted by the supervisor in the case where the ﬁrm is vulnerable only to princi-
pal/supervisor collusion. (c) the eﬃciency loss sustained by the ﬁrm is identical to that sustained
in the case where only principal/supervisor collusion is possible.
As explained above, the principal has the choice of two policies to deter principal/supervisor col-
lusion. However, compared with the case where the ﬁrm is vulnerable only to principal/supervisor
collusion, in the presence of both types of collusion, the stake eliminating policy has an extra cost.
Indeed, using the stake eliminating policy and setting w∅ above 0 then makes supervisor/agent col-
lusion costly to deter. Expressed diﬀerently, if the principal decides to adopt the stake eliminating
policy, the prevention of one type of collusion increases the cost of the prevention of the other type
of collusion. In this case, collusive activities negatively interact. When both types of collusion are
accounted for, the expected cost of the stake eliminating policy thus rises from C2 ≡ [1−p(1−π)]γ
pπ
to C3 ≡ [1−p(1−π)(1−k)]γ
pπ
and reaches its highest level for k = 1. By contrast, the expected cost
of the incentive policy is not aﬀected by the proliferation of collusive activities. When the ﬁrm
adopts the incentive policy, collusion between the supervisor and the agent thus remains harmless,
and hence eﬃciency is not aﬀected.
Regarding eﬃciency, we thus have that in the presence of both types of collusion the expected
cost of collusion deterrence increases but not systematically. Hence, the proliferation of collusive
activities does not systematically reduce the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm.
Since in a ﬁrm vulnerable to two types of collusion there is a negative interaction between
collusive activities associated with the stake eliminating policy, this policy is less often adopted
than in the case where only principal/supervisor collusion is possible. Formally, we have π > π˜
for p > 1 − k. As explained in the previous subsection, given that when the incentive policy is
adopted the supervisor receives a rent and that the incentive policy is now more often adopted,
the proliferation of collusive activities is advantageous for the supervisor and disadvantageous for
15
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the agent.
The following corollary - that summarizes our ﬁndings by expressing how the threat of two
types of collusion aﬀects a multi-level hierarchy compared with the case where only a single type
of collusion is possible - shows how crucial it is to allow for more than a single type of collusion
when investigating multi-level ﬁrms.
Corollary. The proliferation of collusive activities in ﬁrms:
1. Modiﬁes the conﬁguration of the optimal policy.
2. May increase the expected cost of preventing each type of collusion.
3. Is not always harmful.
4. Is beneﬁcial (resp. detrimental) to the supervisor (resp. the agent).
5 Conclusion
In the last two decades the literature on principal-supervisor-agent ﬁrms has largely studied a
speciﬁc type of bias in supervision, namely supervisor/agent collusion. We have extended the
analysis of these hierarchies by also considering the possibility of principal/supervisor collusion.
We have shown that the proliferation of collusive activities deeply aﬀects the contractual choices
of a hierarchical ﬁrm, and hence have proved that focusing on a single type of collusion in the
analysis of hierarchies is deceptive.
16
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Whether the ﬁrm is vulnerable or not to collusive activities, it is
obviously optimal to set s∅ as low as allowed by the limited liability constraints, that is s∅ = 0.
Since the expected cost of the ﬁrm is increasing in wL and reducing this wage does not make
constraints more severe (more speciﬁcally, it relaxes the agent’s incentive constraint), it is optimal
to set this wage as low as the limited liability constraint wL ≥ 0 makes it possible. We therefore
have wL = 0. From the same argument w∅ = sL = sH = 0 and the principal optimally sets wH as
low as allowed by the agent’s incentive constraint, that is, wH =
γ
pπ
(since wL = 0).
Proof of Proposition 3. To both soften constraints and lower the expected cost of the
ﬁrm, wL, wH and sL should be reduced. Given that the agent is protected by limited liability,
it is optimal to set sL = 0. By the same argument, wL = 0 and the agent’s incentive constraint
becomes wH =
γ
pπ
. There are then two cases to consider with respect to k.
1. k < 1. Recalling that optimally s∅ = 0 and substituting wH =
γ
pπ
into the princi-
pal/supervisor no-collusion constraint, this constraint writes sH ≥
k
1−k (
γ
pπ
−w∅). This constraint
may then be relaxed by increasing w∅. However, since setting w∅ >
γ
pπ
instead of w∅ ≤
γ
pπ
increases
the expected cost of the ﬁrm (because this cost is increasing in w∅) without allowing to reduce
sH below 0 (because of the limited liability constraint sH ≥ 0), the principal sets w∅ ∈
[
0, γ
pπ
]
.
The relevant constraint on sH is then sH ≥
k
1−k (
γ
pπ
− w∅), that is, the limited liability constraint
sH ≥ 0 is redundant.
Given that the objective function is increasing in sH and lowering this wage does not make the
other constraints more severe, we have sH =
k
1−k (
γ
pπ
− w∅). Substituting this equation into the
objective function of program [P1], this program becomes:
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min γ1−k +
(1−k)(1−p)−pπk
1−k w∅
w∅
s.t. w∅ ∈
[
0, γ
pπ
]
.
Two cases have then to be distinguished.
Let ∆ ≡ (1 − k)(1 − p) − pπk. Then if ∆ ≥ 0, that is, if π ≤ π˜ ≡ (1−k)(1−p)
pk
, the objective
function is increasing in w∅. It is then optimal to set w∅ as low as possible, that is, w∅ = 0. We
then have sH =
kγ
(1−k)pπ .
If instead ∆ < 0, that is, if π > π˜, the objective function is decreasing in w∅, and it is hence
optimal to set w∅ as high as possible. The principal then sets w∅ =
γ
pπ
. We then have sH = 0.
Since we have π˜ ≥ 1 if p ≤ 1 − k, and thus we then systematically have ∆ ≥ 0, the optimal
contracts are: (a) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, 0,
γ
pπ
) and (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0,
kγ
(1−k)pπ ) for (i) p ≤ 1− k; (ii)
p > 1−k and π ≤ π˜. The expected cost of the ﬁrm is then C1 ≡ γ1−k . (b) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0,
γ
pπ
, γ
pπ
)
and (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0, 0) for p > 1 − k and π > π˜. The expected cost of the ﬁrm is then
C2 ≡ [1−p(1−π)]γ
pπ
.
2. k = 1. Given that the principal’s objective function is increasing in w∅ and sH - and
lowering these wages does not make constraints more severe in this case - we optimally have w∅
= γ
pπ
(= wH) from the principal/supervisor no-collusion constraint and sH = 0 from the limited
liability constraints. The expected cost of the ﬁrm is then C2.
Proof of Proposition 4. As in the previous proof, to both soften constraints and lower the
expected cost of the ﬁrm, wH should be reduced. The agent’s incentive constraint thus becomes
wH =
γ
pπ
+ wL. There are then two cases to consider with respect to k.
1. k < 1. Substituting wH =
γ
pπ
+ wL into the principal/supervisor no-collusion constraint,
this constraint writes sH ≥
k
1−k (
γ
pπ
+wL −w∅). This constraint may be relaxed by increasing w∅.
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However, given that setting w∅ >
γ
pπ
+ wL instead of w∅ ≤
γ
pπ
+ wL both increases the expected
cost of the ﬁrm (because this cost is increasing in w∅) and makes the supervisor/agent no-collusion
constraint sL ≥ k(w∅ − wL) more severe without allowing to reduce sH below 0 (because of the
limited liability constraint sH ≥ 0), we have w∅ ≤
γ
pπ
+ wL. The relevant constraint on sH is
then sH ≥
k
1−k (
γ
pπ
+ wL − w∅). In other words, the limited liability constraint sH ≥ 0 may be
disregarded.
Following a similar argument, we have that the relevant constraint on sL is the supervisor/agent
no-collusion constraint sL ≥ k(w∅−wL). Expressed diﬀerently, the limited liability constraint sL ≥
0 may be disregarded. It is, indeed, possible to relax the supervisor/agent no-collusion constraint
by increasing wL. However, given that setting wL > w∅ instead of wL ≤ w∅ both increases the
expected cost of the ﬁrm (because this cost is increasing in wL) and makes the principal/supervisor
no-collusion constraint sH ≥
k
1−k (
γ
pπ
+wL−w∅) more severe without allowing to reduce sL below
0 (because of the limited liability constraint sL ≥ 0), we have wL ≤ w∅. Summarizing, we have
w∅ ≤
γ
pπ
+ wL and wL ≤ w∅, that is w∅ ∈
[
wL,
γ
pπ
+wL
]
with wL ≥ 0, and hence the relevant
constraints on sL and sH are respectively sL ≥ k(w∅ −wL) and sH ≥
k
1−k (
γ
pπ
+ wL − w∅).
The objective function is increasing in sL and sH and lowering these wages does not make the
other constraints more severe. We therefore have sL = k(w∅ −wL) and sH =
k
1−k (
γ
pπ
+wL −w∅).
These equations should be substituted into the objective function of program [P2], which then
becomes:
min γ1−k +
p[(1−k)[1−(1−π)k]+πk]
1−k wL +
(1−k)[1−p[1−(1−π)k]]−pπk
1−k w∅
wL, w∅
s.t. wL ≥ 0 and w∅ ∈
[
wL,
γ
pπ
+wL
]
.
There are two cases to distinguish.
Noting Θ ≡ (1 − k) [1− p [1− (1− π)k]] − pπk, if Θ ≥ 0, that is, if π ≤ π ≡ (1−k)[1−p(1−k)]
pk(2−k) ,
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the objective function is increasing in w∅, and hence optimally w∅ = wL. After substituting this
expression into the objective function of the above program, this function becomes γ1−k +wL. This
function is increasing in wL, and hence it is optimal to set wL as low as possible, that is, wL = 0.
It follows that w∅ = 0, and therefore wH =
γ
pπ
, sL = 0 and sH =
kγ
(1−k)pπ .
If Θ < 0, that is, if π > π, the objective function is decreasing in w∅, and w∅ should be set as
high as possible. We then have w∅ =
γ
pπ
+ wL. After substituting this equation into the objective
function of the above program, this function writes [1−p(1−π)(1−k)]γ
pπ
+ wL. Since this function
is increasing in wL, it is optimal to set wL as low as possible, that is, wL = 0. It follows that
wH = w∅ =
γ
pπ
, and thus sL =
kγ
pπ
and sH = 0.
Given that we have π ≥ 1 for p ≤ 1 − k, we then systematically have Θ ≥ 0 in this case.
The optimal contracts are thus: (a) (wL, w∅, wH) = (0, 0,
γ
pπ
) and (sL, s∅, sH) = (0, 0,
kγ
(1−k)pπ )
for (i) p ≤ 1 − k; (ii) p > 1 − k and π ≤ π. The expected cost of the ﬁrm is then C1. (b)
(wL, w∅, wH) = (0,
γ
pπ
, γ
pπ
) and (sL, s∅, sH) = (
kγ
pπ
, 0, 0) for p > 1−k and π > π. The expected cost
of the ﬁrm is then C3 ≡ [1−p(1−π)(1−k)]γ
pπ
.
2. k = 1. As above, since the ﬁrm’s objective function is increasing in w∅ - and lowering this
wage does not make constraints more severe in this case - we optimally have w∅ = wH =
γ
pπ
+wL
from the principal/supervisor no-collusion constraint and the agent’s binding incentive constraint.
Once w∅ = wH =
γ
pπ
+wL is substituted into both the objective function of program [P2] and the
supervisor/agent no-collusion constraint, this program writes:
min [1−p(1−π)]γ
pπ
+wL + p [(1− π)sL + πsH ]
wL, sL, sH
s.t. wL ≥ 0, sL ≥
γ
pπ
and sH ≥ 0.
Obviously wL = 0, sL =
γ
pπ
and sH = 0. The expected cost of the ﬁrm is then
γ
pπ
.
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Downward biased supervision
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Figure 1                                                        Principal (P), Supervisor (S) and Agent (A)
Firm with a single type of bias in supervision
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Figure 2                                                        Principal (P), Supervisor (S) and Agent (A)
Firm with multiple types of bias in supervision
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